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“public procurement contracting” (Langlais 2008). These environmental
changes are likely to transform CSO-government relationships.
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1 Introduction
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are an integral component in the complex
network that comprises the public sphere, which is defined as a place where
citizens deal with matters of common interest (Wagner 2000). CSOs are privately
organized and, because they operate to achieve social objectives, they do not seek
to maximize profits. Anheier and Themudo (2002) note that CSOs include many
more organizations (and organizational forms) than the term “non-governmental
organization” suggests and may operate in networks, and within and across
national borders. This diverse set of organizations includes cooperatives, mutual
funds, and associations delivering social services in education, health and other
welfare segments, advocacy, and international aid (Anheier and Themudo 2002;
Archambault 2001; Cumming 2008; Laville and Nyssens 2000; Wagner 2000).
While CSOs are private, they contribute and are inter-dependent with public
organizations inhabiting the public sphere. Since Habermas (1967), the concept
of the public sphere can be presented as a mediation space where individuals
use reason to develop a political consensus around issues including immigration
and the right to work or receive welfare. Accordingly, citizens must be linked
into the public sphere to discuss economic, private, and political issues (Fraser
2010). CSOs have a role to play in building that link. For example, many CSOs
work within and alongside local (public) communities, designing appropriate
services, balancing demand and supply, and advocating for improvements in
society. Their activities depend on funding sources (public and private) and
resources (such as staff, volunteers, and premises) (Laville and Nyssens 2000).
Thus, CSOs face challenges to achieving their social objectives when their
funding and resources are constrained.
Funding policies are a barometer of public sphere interrelationships
(Toepler 2010). Internationally, CSOs are suffering constrained funding, causing
Toepler (2010) to argue that government-CSO relations are the “single most
important concern across the world” (as shown, for example, by Donnelly-Cox
et al. 2012). It is particularly pertinent in France, where a radical overhaul of
welfare funding and delivery was undertaken during the Sarkozy regime (2007–
2012). In addition, Sarkozy sought to structurally reform employment policies
which had a definitive impact on migrant social services. This research analyses
the impact of these reforms on the relationships between a French CSO
(Association) delivering social inclusion services to migrants and refugees and
its local public funders. Utilizing the lens of resource dependency, we focus on
the interrelationships and interactions and assess the possible responses an
organization can make in order to survive reforming structures. This analysis
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seeks to generate new understandings of CSOs’ possible responses to centraliz-
ing power and local inter-dependencies.
In order to analyze the political change, first, the article considers the
structure and evolution of relationships between public funders and CSOs in
France. The changes referred to above are then summarized. In the following
section, the context of the CSO under study and the methodology used for this
qualitative research are outlined. In Section four, the case study is presented,
followed by an analysis utilizing resource dependence theory to reveal the
options available to a CSO whose access to public funding is threatened by
such changes. Finally a discussion and conclusion complete the article, includ-
ing suggestions for future research.
2 Context
2.1 French associations – an overview
The history of French CSOs is both very long and deep-rooted, although the
inclusion of CSOs in the French public sphere is a relatively recent phenomenon
(Archambault 2001; Wagner 2000). Archambault (2001) explains that etatism
underpinned the central State’s “fight against local power in any form.”
Historically, the State has either responded to its citizens’ needs or been
expected to remunerate others delivering welfare services (including hospitals,
asylums, and schools). This expectation is apparent from the comprehensive
social security system in France, introduced in 1945 (Archambault 2001).
Another example of etatism is the suppression of the incorporation of associa-
tions following the French Revolution (from 1791)1 until the passing of the
Associations Act in 1901. Yet, notwithstanding etatism, the historic existence of
guilds and other associations points to the operation of solidarity in the social
economy (Archambault 2001). Further, since the 1901 Act, CSOs (Associations)
have formed to support the poor and needy, new migrants, environmental, and
other causes.2 Work councils, funded by a compulsory levy on large employers
1 The Décret d’Allarde and Loi Le Chapelier in 1791 suppressed guilds and social subsidiaries,
while the 1810 Napoleonic Code stated that no association of over 20 people could be created
without the government’s agreement (Archambault 2001; Wagner 2000).
2 The period of Nazi occupation in World War II was an exception to association growth with
restrictions on foreigners’ associations from 1939 onwards. The Vichy government which fol-
lowed the defeat of the occupying Germans also dissolved all Masonic lodges and many other
political associations in 1941; the restriction was repealed in 1981 (Archambault 2001).
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(from 1946), spawned day-care, social services for employees and their families,
and training and employment programs for others in the community; a further
employer tax from 1971 also subsidizes continuing education schemes for citizens
(Archambault 2001). Additional improvements in the legal context for CSOs
include the 1987 sponsorship law (allowing most Associations to elicit donations)
and in 2003 and 2006 increasing the deductibility of corporate and individual
donations respectively. A further improvement was the 1990 confirmation of
certain CSOs’ exemption from tax on profit-related activities (Cumming 2009).
Other reforms have evidenced growing local autonomy, for example, the
Decentralization Act of 1982 devolved power to local government3 (in particular
larger municipalities) to decide and deliver local social services policies (Cole
2006, 2011).4 Cole (2006, 31) suggests that the program of decentralization
(further reforms occurred in 2003/2004) can be “best understood in terms of
liberating the entrepreneurial energies and political capacity of local and regio-
nal players.” The local leaders were therefore key to successful decentralization.
In this context, French national assembly members are highly likely to maintain
multiple, local roles and many are revered as dignatories (called les notables). As
elections are hotly contested, it is necessary for les notables to have strong local
connections and serve their constituency (Costa and Kerrouche 2009).
Progressive welfare decentralization has spawned the development of coop-
erative relationships between CSOs and local government (Archambault 2001;
Wagner 2000). The first social policy specifically using CSOs as vehicles was
passed in 1988, to protect migrants and other unemployed/poor citizens from
social exclusion (Archambault 2001). Since then, CSOs have been increasingly
relied upon to deliver programs. Tchernonog (2013) estimated France had 1.3
million operating CSOs in 2005 but that only 183,000 employed an estimated
1.49 million full-time equivalent staff (6% of the total French workforce), 57% of
whom were employed in the social and health-related sector5 and were mostly
financially supported by public resources (Morange 2008; Langlais 2008).
Staffed CSOs expended 83% of French CSOs’ combined annual budgets (totaling
3 France has three main levels of local governments with distinctive realms of action: the 101
General Councils, the 26 Regional Councils, and the 37,000 municipalities (also called commu-
nes). The General Council is an elected assembly of a departement of France and a Regional
Council is an elected assembly of a region of France. Each assembly has specific and different
missions to fulfill. They all contribute to the funding of CSOs in France.
4 Approximately 37,000 communes exist in France (40% of the communes in the European
Union), but only about 1,000 have more than 10,000 inhabitants.
5 We do not mean that the paid workers employed by the CSOs belonging to the “social and
health-related sector” are all social workers. Most of them are involved in management,
coordination, and support function activities.
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85.1 billion Euros and accounting for 3.5% of French GDP6). Less than half (49%)
of their funding originated from public resources and, more specifically, 24.7%
from public subsidies (Tchernonog 2013).7 Mizrahi-Tchernonog (1992) tracked
the effect of decentralization and the increased subsidies paid by local autho-
rities to CSOs, finding large municipalities mainly supported activities connected
to municipal policy, and that officials sought “better solutions” and improved
cost-quality ratios. For instance, to reduce costs, municipalities encouraged
volunteering by paying higher subsidies to associations that employed volun-
teers. They also collaborated with associations who could respond to the diverse
needs of local populations as a “better solution” than monopolistic government
providers.
CSOs have been instrumental in providing social services to new migrants.
France’s Pasqua Laws passed in 1986 and 1993 tightened immigration policies,
although clandestine immigration is estimated at 80–100,000 people per
annum. Archambault (2001) notes that migrants’ children can often be excluded
from employment and consequent social benefits. Migrant social exclusion was
addressed by the 1988 policy providing them with a minimum income for social
integration (Revenu minimum d’insertion or RMI), which was specifically
designed to empower CSOs as the agent for change in immigrants’ lives.
Measures of success include Belot and Bréchon’s (2012) report that France has
become increasingly tolerant of immigrants.
2.2 Changes in the government frameworks 2007–2012
In his 2007 presidential campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy emphasized the need for
structural reform to French policy-making in relation to work. In particular, he
argued normatively as to the value of hard work, condemning “welfare depen-
dency” (Milner 2012). While history shows his rhetoric and reform were fru-
strated by the Global Financial Crisis, the five years of Sarkozy’s Presidency
evidenced radical changes in the funding of work and training schemes and
policies toward unemployed (including migrants). In particular, the RMI was
replaced by a new guaranteed minimum income (Revenu de solidarité active or
6 If the work of volunteers is included, the amount is 4.5% of GDP
7 Here is the detailed breakdown of the different sources of funding of French CSOs based on
data collected on a national basis for the year 2011 by Tchernonog (2013). Global consolidated
budget of all French CSOS: 85.1 Billions Euros for the year 2011. Private funding: 51% made up
of membership fees 11%, donation and private sponsorship 4%, private revenues: 36%. Public
funding: 49% made up of subsidies 24.7% and other public revenues: 24.8%.
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RSA),8 and a requirement in 20079 for immigrants to gain a minimum French
language level and demonstrate endorsement of French constitutional principles
so that they are “work ready.” In line with trends in the European Union, the
French government relied on the private sector (in particular CSOs) to deliver
programs in this respect. Yet, in accordance with the articles 86 to 88 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community, the EU law prohibits state aid for
production companies and service providers. This ban has the objective to
promote and foster free competition in Europe. Even if the EU has recognized
the specificity of social services of “general interest,” most CSOs activities are
considered under this regulation as “economical activities,” meaning public
institutions shouldn’t support them. The qualification of general interest only
entails lighter requirements for procuring social services.
President Sarkozy also instigated reforms of the state and local govern-
ments’ institutional machinery in order to improve State productivity (Cole
2011). At the local level, the State’s 2010 budget capped local governments’
business rate charges, effectively controlling local government finances (Cole
2011). Therefore, while the 2004 Decentralization Act allowed variations in local
taxation rates (Cole 2006), following Sarkozy’s 2010 reforms, local governments
were legally constrained in their ability to increase their own resources through
taxes and had limited freedom to spend revenues as they wished.
In addition, a radical overhaul of the relationships between public funders
and CSOs has been advocated in two French parliamentary reports (Morange
2008; Warsmann 2009) and a report requested by one French ministry (Langlais
2008). Though many of their numerous and far-reaching recommendations are
yet to be implemented, these reports have nonetheless signaled a culture
change: encouraging public funders to take a more active approach and presa-
ging new control and evaluation mechanisms. The reports’ main recommenda-
tions are twofold: first, requiring public funders to become effective partners to
CSOs. For example, local and national public administrations are encouraged to
formulate strategies to integrate CSOs into their policies, rather than financing
CSOs out of habit or due to persuasively written grant applications: to move
away from a culture of “granting subsidies” to one based on “public procure-
ment contracting” (Langlais 2008, 38). Consequently “a unique portal” is being
developed to centralize reviews of CSOs’ funding requests and clarify the
8 The RSA guarantees a minimum level of benefits to long-term unemployed but requires them
to train for work and to consider job vacancies offered; it also provides a benefit to those in low-
paid employment (Milner 2012).
9 Law on the control of immigration, integration, and right to asylum passed the 20th of
November, 2007.
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respective roles of each administration. These strategies are intended to bring
increased transparency in public funding allocation processes, offsetting the
lack of meaningful data centralization (for example the consolidated total of
public funds allocated to a specific CSO). Further, they argue that boosting co-
ordination between the different local and national political bodies and admin-
istrations would increase productivity, reduce cross- and multiple-financing and
competition between CSOs (Morange 2008).
Second, the authors recommend retreating from classical ex-ante control
approaches toward evaluation focused on the content and outcomes of funded
activities (Langlais 2008; Morange 2008). Evaluation is hardly novel to France, it
has been used to regulate CSO activities through different pieces of legislation since
2002, especially in the social and health-related fields (Morange 2008). However, the
authors consider that genuine evaluation practices have seldom permeated public
sphere funding relationships. They identify a lack of professional skills in CSOs and
funders, whose staffs are mostly unable to deliver the necessary information
required to engage in multiple-year planning (for example, general and analytical
budgets, meaningful performance indicators) (Morange 2008). These authors reaf-
firm the need to transcend an accounting-focused, narrow-minded view of control
and to embrace a more dialogical and partnership-based approach.
This research therefore occurs during a period of major political upheaval to
public sphere inter-relationships in France when CSOs are to forge new funding
partnerships (Engels et al. 2006) in a tight economic environment. Combined with
the major changes in work policies, we ask what the impact of such a radical change
will be and what possible response an organization can make, if it is to survive.
3 Case study context and methodology
3.1 Case study context and background
In light of the radical changes in attitudes toward work for migrants, the limiting
of decentralization (and its impact on local programs for migrants), we chose a
case study in which the effects of these changes could be observed. Our case
study organization (COPR) is a CSO founded in 1969 with the purpose of making
easier the socialization of foreign families – migrants and refugees – in France.
Its social services, delivered in an underprivileged territory located in the
surroundings of Strasbourg, aim for this socialization and to reduce the inci-
dence of foreigners’ children dropping out of school (these are described as
activities in Figure 1).
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As shown in Figure 1, COPR is part of a complex network of CSOs, local, central
and European public funders. The relationships between those actors display
two main features. First, mutual financial support and cooperation has endured
over a long period. Second, the roles played by the different actors of this
network are not defined in a clear-cut way but are interwoven. For example,
COPR’s President is also an elected local government representative of the area
and presides over other CSOs. Some COPR Board members are also involved in
the management of, or act as volunteers in, other CSOs. Reciprocally, many
representatives of local public funders also volunteer in local CSOs, thus
strengthening the public sphere.
COPR has enjoyed legitimacy with the municipality and its other public funders
as a major local social service provider. Its seniority, strong involvement in this
underprivileged territory, and its enduring reputation as an innovator contributes to
this favorable assessment. COPR’s twomain programs cross “occupational insertion”
(French for Foreigners (FFF) to facilitate migrants’ work-readiness) and “social
insertion” (FFF and la papothèque). The FFF programs cater to foreign adults living
in France, seeking to enhance their mastery of French and develop inter-personal







Public funders as a





















Figure 1: From 1980s to 2009: mission based funding
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(who are verging on exclusion and facing economic difficulties) to participate in the
education of their children through cultural, artistic, or fun activities. Founded 15
years ago, la papothèque – which literally means chatting while doing something –
played a significant role in COPR’s prestige and reputation as an innovator among
public funders.
More than 95% of COPR’s revenues derive from public funders. New
activities launched from 2002 to 2010 increased its income by 62%: the two
main funders granted between 52% and 74% of total annual revenues and the
third largest funder (now 20% of total revenues) has increased its share from 2%
in 2002. La papothèque attracts 36% of COPR’s total funding. While staff costs
account for 72% of COPR’s operational expenses, COPR relies on more than
150 volunteers. Many of these strongly motivated volunteers have contributed
regularly for many years and without them COPR’s programs could not be
delivered and/or would not be financially sustainable. Most funders recognize
the value of COPR’s high number of skilled and dedicated volunteers.
Nevertheless, while volunteers are strongly attached to the activities they under-
take (e.g., la papothèque), few are involved organizationally as they do not seek
to become involved beyond their realm of activity.
3.2 Methodology
To undertake this research, we used an interpretive case study approach, gath-
ering multiple sources of evidence: including interviews, activity observation,
and document analysis. Thirty-three semi-directed interviews were conducted
with internal and external stakeholders of COPR, including board members,
employees, volunteers, and funders’ officials. Most interviews, lasting between
one and two hours, were recorded and transcribed in French. For two intervie-
wees who refused the recording option, handwritten notes were taken during the
interview. In addition, additional contextual information was diarized for each
interview. Interviews were translated for use in this article by one author and
checked by the second author against the transcripts.
To cross-reference these data, informal exchanges and observations of
COPR’s members’ daily activities were recorded in memorandum form. In parti-
cular, we attended FFF classes and witnessed social encounters organized in la
papothèque. These observations were insightful as to the nature of the relation-
ships between employees, volunteers, and beneficiaries and facilitated our
interpretations of the formal interviews.
Document analysis was also undertaken to triangulate the data (Patton
2002). Documents included financial statements, budgetary documents, letters
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of information published by COPR, its surveys and reports, funders’ procedures,
and COPR’s associated accountability documents. All the data (interviews,
observations, other documents) were stored, organized, and coded in French.
We adopted an inductive approach to analyze the data across the research team
(Tesch 1990), discussing emerging patterns and organizing the data as follows.
First in order to answer the question of “what is the impact of change,” we
assess possible mission drift (analyzing the organization’s values) and to answer
the question of “what possible responses can an organization make,” we utilize
an interpretive scheme informed by a resource dependency framework.
The case study method is not without its limitations. The “real-life” context
of such research creates access difficulties and the need to synthesize and
aggregate data that may be deemed confidential if reported directly (Irvine
and Gaffikin 2006). For this reason, acronyms of case studies are often used,
as in this study. Further, case studies must choose between seeking general-
izability of findings and exposing unique data, that is, between myriad case
studies and a single case study. However, in line with Ryan, Scapens, and
Theobald (1992), we do not seek generalizability in this interpretive research;
rather we seek to analyze possible responses to political change through apply-
ing resource dependency theory to a single CSO confronting changed circum-
stances, and specifically in a case where other than financial dependency can be
observed. The next section presents the case study.
4 Case study
As could be expected in the new context, COPR’s public funders demand greater
control in allocating public money to CSOs, centralizing administration of CSOs’
project proposals and seeking coherence in funded projects at territory level.
Two crises therefore test COPR: reduction in funding and partnership change.
These crises challenge COPR’s “three pillars” which have informed their suc-
cessful development over four decades: namely a public funding, the mission,
and the values of the CSO (engagement, tolerance, dialog and participation,
tenacity, neutrality, importance of social bonds). We present the case against
these pillars which are central to the mission of COPR.
4.1 One COPR pillar: a public funding
COPR, initiated in response to a public need, depends on public funding and
members’ operate strong beliefs (arising from an etatist background) that public
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services should be publicly funded. Yet, funders disagree, for example, an
interviewee noted:
… when classes were put in place ten years ago, COPR, without being even a candidate or a
promoter of the project just decided to do it and after one year sent us the bill explaining
that X actions were undertaken and X Euros spent. We were being presented with a fait
accompli. (…) It was not budgeted at their level and often they would resort to these
practices. (…) However, public funders told them they should change and organize them-
selves better. (…) There must be a co-production of the project (…) We are not just funders,
we refuse to be merely funders… (Funder)
This funder acknowledges COPR’s expertise, but COPR’s expectation of public
funding annoys them. COPR’s dependence on public funding begets high expo-
sure to political fluctuations such as have occurred in the local and central
government space. Thus, despite the public funding pillar, COPR’s President has
advocated diversifying revenue to reduce dependence, in particular developing
a social enterprise, as noted:
This sense of urgency, or, this sense that should be a sense of urgency is due to the fact
that this CSO has always been funded by public money (…). At the end of the day, we truly
are an auxiliary of public authorities … I would like a commercial branch to be opened. …
(but the members) do not want to hear about it for now … They only look at it one way, as
if capitalism was entering the CSO. (…) For them, volunteering is volunteering. Now they
say, if the State wants us to do it, it has to pay for it. (COPR President)
Funders’ speeches destabilize COPR’s public funding dependence and the represen-
tatives of the COPR’s third-largest funder are the most radical, as they explain their
four-year national and regional contractualization process. Heightened professiona-
lization can be observed in the funder’s Alsatian arm, which gained an ISO accred-
itation for their processes, largely based on for-profit sector managerial practices. In
addition to adapting the funder’s national missions to the Alsatian context (and thus
local actions), local representatives portray their changes as “an entrepreneurial
shift”, which, along with professionalization, they seek to expand to CSOs. While
they state they want to partner with CSOs to pursue goals set by their public
organization, it is on the funders’ (not the CSOs’) terms. A funder noted:
Considering CSOs, I think, it must be said, they are operators, operators of public policies
that we support but they are operators, which have had a long history. (…) CSOs experi-
ence the same trend towards entrepreneurship, the same move towards market-based
orientation, the same search for effectiveness and efficiency … all this prevails little by
little over the CSO’s historical logic, which is one of expression, expression of solidarity, of
militantism for a just cause. And now, behind each CSO, we see a firm and it is crystal clear
that whenever we meet with people from a CSO not having this attitude, not feeling this
entrepreneurship-minded spirit (…) we have a misunderstanding with them … (Funder)
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The changes in this resource provider’s goals are at odds with COPR’s values and
projects, as the interviewee continued:
I think COPR gives this impression to be part of the old-style CSO with its volunteers and
also their unabated willingness to stick to their own goals and project. They are really
convinced by it and truth is, they have achieved significant results on that matter, but they
give the impression that, as time goes by, they live in a bubble and they are expert in their
field. But when it comes to dealing with external stakeholders: providing reporting,
elaborating strategy, discussing financial matters, working with institutional partners…
they make us feel that they do it because they must but that it is really not their prime
concern. (…) They do not behave like real partners. (Funder)
COPR members argue that public funders have no right to disrupt their funding,
as COPR’s social contribution fills a gap (socializing immigrants) that should
never have existed. They claim that public authorities have failed the Strasbourg
community and public funding is essential. These members do not agree COPR
should open itself to new private funders whom they do not trust.
In this region, funders have recently subscribed to a unique portal (as
described in Section 2.2.), thus funders limit financing to activities and require
competitive tenders. Yet, some public funders’ representatives are not totally
convinced that resorting to competitive tenders is appropriate for certain social
services. They also claim that importing management practices from the private
sector is misleading if it is not adapted to the local context. One funder noted:
… we organize competitive tenders… as it is requested by XYZ but what we are really
interested in are the organizations doing the job we need…. such as offering French For
Foreigners classes in under-privileged areas and being well recognized for that. There are
not so many of them available … For this specific activity and area, not so many other
organizations than [COPR] can do it. And since they are able to do it, we are not going to
search for a competitor for this area … the way these tenders are made at the national level
for helping people get a job for example … we see they become national, then European.
Those selected are the ones pricing at the lowest level (…) This means that they just know
nothing about our local context. (Funder)
In addition to increased professionalization, the gloomy economic environment has
reduced funds allocated to CSOs. The President of the General Council (local govern-
ment) made a pessimistic speech to CSO representatives from the region noting:
From the fiscal year 2011 onwards, our tax freedom will be reduced from 44% down to 11%
of our total revenues. (…) Our debt? At the end of 2009, it will amount to half a billion
Euros. This is sustainable, yet it is significant. If we go on with the same spending
dynamics and take into account the new capping limit now set on our revenues, our
debt level will peak at 1.5 billion Euros in 2014. This would not be sustainable. (…) It goes
far beyond a short-term crisis. (…) How did we get there? The national government has
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transferred us new responsibilities in the social domain and these new social expenses are
really dynamic in terms of growth. (Local Government)
The State’s capping of local governments’ rates affects local government’s ability
to pay CSOs to meet their social obligations. COPR’s President must debunk
members’ arguments that COPR is “too big to fail” as, despite other CSOs’
valuable social work, many have closed. Nevertheless, he is convinced that
COPR should seek private funding which will generate more public funding for
COPR. Further, he believes that COPR’s projects’ qualities will appeal to funders
seeking cost reductions. His legitimacy as an elected local government member
gives this extra weight. He comments:
When I attend a meeting with other elected representatives where CSOs are being dis-
cussed, they look at me first as an elected representative but they also remember me as
President of COPR and they think “we can’t take away his subsidy like that”. You see, I tell
you they cut down on so many budgets. Other CSOs are forced to close down, to lay off
their entire staff. For now, they only requested from us to reduce our overhead expenses.
(COPR President)
As can be seen, COPR’s pillar of “a public funding” is in jeopardy. This has
triggered intense debate among its members, surfacing an ideological divide.
Each of COPR’s responses in this section shows a longing to return to (or retain)
etatism, with the State funding CSOs to provide welfare. Nevertheless, the
funders are intransigent – the reforms require new funding and professionalism
to ensure effective use of the State’s scarce resources.
4.2 A second COPR pillar: the mission (and program)
Two decisions of public funders directly affect COPR’s mission and program.
First, a significant minor funder ceased funding COPR following an audit show-
ing that COPR’s programs, though socially relevant, were incompatible with the
funder’s objective of boosting the occupational insertion rate. The European
representative explained that COPR’s FFF classes were:
… said to favor occupational insertion but, truth is, their actions were more oriented
towards social insertion. And there lay a big issue since our officials said that all requests
drifting from our main objective [occupational insertion] would be turned down. (Funder)
Due to COPR’s desire to stay close to its mission and program and deliver social
insertion in addition (and/or instead of) occupational insertion, it lost 8% of its
total revenues when this funding ceased. Notwithstanding that, COPR
explained:
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So far, our FFF classes gathered more women than men and, now they tell us that to get
the funding we have to teach French with a specific purpose of helping the trainees find a
job. (…) This is an issue for us. (COPR board member)
COPR works with many migrant women who stay at home to care for young
children. Meeting the goal of occupational insertion is deemed secondary to
social insertion as explained further:
We agree to do that, but we also want to train people who won’t be looking for a job. We
consider that learning a language is a way to help them get a social life, to help them help
their own children, it’s a lot of different things and it is not only about getting a job. There
are some women with five, six, seven kids and they won’t search for a job but it would be a
great improvement if they master the command of French to visit the socio-cultural center,
to take part in social activities that exist in their neighborhood. It is also essential for their
own children who are often ashamed of their parents since they do not speak French. This
is usual. Learning French could help improve a lot of things. That’s why it hurts our belief
when it is requested that it be done with a professionally driven purpose. (COPR board
member)
Volunteers at COPR do not seek to be involved in the management of this CSO as
they are primarily focused on the fulfillment of their social mission with
migrants. The awareness of being a part of COPR is even secondary to their
firsthand experiences as volunteers doing fieldwork.
All my life I have run away from board meetings and I have been lucky enough to avoid
doing these administrative and management tasks. (COPR volunteer, 1)
When I first came at La Papothèque, I was looking for a place welcoming parents and
children. I did not look for a particular CSO. When I arrived at La Papothèque, we did not
feel we belonged to a broader CSO. At the time we knew there were tensions between La
Papothèque and the Board but I couldn’t care less. What I was doing there, welcoming
parents and children, was all that truly mattered to me. (COPR Volunteer, 2)
I think that the awareness that this CSO is in danger, only board members really have it.
Paid workers might have been more sensitive to it after one of them got laid off recently for
economic purpose. But volunteers, I think they do not realize it at all. I have the feeling
they have not acknowledged it yet. (COPR volunteer and current board member)
Volunteers are at best circumspect with the desired focus on occupational inser-
tion and even if some of them might be willing to adjust their teaching method to
make it look more occupationally driven, they also all witness that the partici-
pants in French For Foreigners classes are miles away from this objective.
Last, some COPR members argue that funders’ statements are ambiguous
and equivocal, as the State must bear the cost of delinquent behavior from un-
socialized migrants (for example) as well as unemployment. They believe that
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COPR should be able to navigate through these zones of ambiguity to leverage
its strong network and stay close to its mission and programs rather than being
forced to change.
4.3 A third COPR pillar: the values
COPR’s values are challenged by the “entrepreneurial move” favored by most
funders as it requires them to compete with other CSOs and for-profit organiza-
tions for program funding, as explained by an interviewee:
… an entrepreneurial CSO now competes on a market. And we also have big CSOs which do
not rejoice at the prospect of facing other operators which are private companies. These
new competitors are ambitious and they have many means at their disposal, I think you
name it “the invisible instrumentation”: professionals mastering the commercial means,
designing beautiful brochures, understanding actor’s games or even inventing new actor’s
games, making speeches which are more and more heard by the local public authorities
and by us since they are fashionable and contrast sharply with old-fashioned speeches, or
at least with speeches from CSOs which we believe have gone a little out of date. (Funder)
COPR’s CEO acknowledges the competitive environment, but opines that it
destroys the partner-based approach that historically prevailed between them.
Today, whenever I meet with a public funder, he/she tells me there is no money left… On
top of that competition, tenders make us compete with other CSOs. This is a catastrophe
and I openly told the Prefect10 since we were invited to feed back our thinking. (…) I told
him this competition ruins our long-lasting partner-based relationships with other CSOs. Of
course we had troubles since some individuals will never get along with one another. But
still, we all wanted to work together, without encroaching on one’s territory, to help our
community. I told him that now there are projects I do not talk about anymore since I am
scared someone could take credit for it. Truth is, five years ago I would never have done
this. I would have said: “we have this idea, what do you think, does anyone want to work
with us?” We would have eventually spearheaded the program and associated with other
CSOs. Now as we live from hand to mouth, searching for money everywhere, if I think I
have a good idea, I keep it for COPR. (COPR CEO)
Thus, COPR’s values of engagement, tolerance, dialog and participation, as well
as neutrality, are threatened as COPR begins to isolate themselves to seek funding.
Nevertheless, some members suggest that COPR should diversify its activ-
ities while staying true to its values and projects advocating that, in the long run,
40% of their total funding should come from new private funding. By utilizing
10 In France, the Prefect is a regional governor who represents the State at the local level.
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its strong and dedicated volunteer resources more effectively, they believe that
overhead expenses can be reduced and innovative activities launched to better
meet new local social needs. COPR would experience again the pioneering spirit
of the organization’s founders through successfully developing groundbreaking
social innovations, for example, generating revenue by helping children at home
doing their homework. Yet, competition is rife and COPR’s volunteers under-
taking this activity might not feel at ease if their services are charged out.
However, the potential benefits for COPR from diversifying its revenues are
significant: new financing for projects they want to do, regaining some influence
over their funders, gaining long-term financing.
Unfortunately, even their greatest asset, their socially bonded volunteer
workforce is under threat from external funders. COPR trains their volunteers
internally, yet their third-largest funder imposed an external training program
on volunteers in programs they funded. COPR perceived this move as an attempt
to control their values and program.
4.4 COPR’s defense of its three pillars
For COPR’s staff, these changes are stressful and divert them from their three
pillars. In particular, COPR’s Managing Director stresses that the search for ad
hoc funding, and managing public funder relationships have become her main
job. She navigates through the various inconsistencies that permeate public
funders’ behaviors.
Second, staff struggles with the instability of some public funders’ policies,
which constrain projects’ coherence. For example, the French Ministry of
Education suddenly decided to require schools to implement remedial courses
for students in despair, and they requested local Councils to co-fund them.
Consequently, some local representatives stopped funding CSOs delivering
these services arguing they didn’t want to pay twice. Further, it appears that
the “unique portal” funder initiative is not operating as well as planned; political
tensions have arisen between disparate public funders and it lacks resources to
adequately review its significant number of submissions and to evaluate propo-
sals’ benefits on-site. Some public funders vary their positions and objectives
rapidly, and experience high turnover in the civil servants involved in the
reviewing process. This inter-funder coordination is yet to reap benefits.
Last but not least, COPR’s Managing Director highlights the paradox that,
although public funders push hard toward professionalization, none of them
seem willing to pay for it. Funders systematically refuse to fund overhead costs
and demand budget frameworks to be split “project by project.” COPR hires
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interns, asks volunteers to help with administrative tasks, and orders supple-
mentary reports from its chartered-accountant to cope with these supplementary
administrative tasks. This paradox has not escaped some funders’ notice.
Despite their ability to mobilize volunteer resources, COPR laid off a
permanent staff member in 2009 due to financial difficulties. COPR’s
Managing Director was somewhat puzzled at some public funders’ representa-
tives’ behaviors following the public announcement of these difficulties when
they proposed new money generating activities to COPR. Although they
applauded COPR’s reduction of overhead costs, one funder ranked the fight for
literacy highly and some of its officials offered, during an improvised meeting in
a bar, to grant new subsidies to COPR, should they manage to formulate a
project aiming at fighting for literacy. This is an example of this funder’s desire
not to allow COPR to die and was no doubt a response to lobbying from the
President. The fact that the fight for literacy had never been a realm of action for
COPR was not really considered by the funder.
Table 1 summarizes the main changes in respect of COPR’s three pillars.
From this overview, we now turn to the application of resource dependency
theory to COPR’s case.
Table 1: Changes affecting COPR’s three pillars following resource shocks
Position Resource providers’ position COPR position
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5 Analysis of case utilizing resource dependency
A key theory in CSO scholarship over recent years has been resource depen-
dence, or organizations’ abilities to acquire and maintain resources (Pfeffer and
Salancik 2003). In particular, from the limited literature analyzing CSOs and
public funding change, Cumming (2008, 2009) understands that CSOs are
resource dependent but may respond differently to environmental change.
Cumming (2009) notes resource dependency is particularly pertinent to CSO
studies seeking to focus on a CSO acting in its own right. Further, the use of
this theory to explain Cumming’s (2008, 2009) French studies, and that of
Froelich (1999) in the United States allows comparisons between this study
and others into CSOs’ reactions to their environment.
In order to garner sufficient financial and non-financial resources, CSOs must
enter relationships with other organizations and individuals. Emerson (1962)
noted that common relational exchanges are characterized by either dependence
or power; that is, the extent to which any organization is able to wield power over
another will depend on the level of dependence on the other. These “power-
dependence” relationships are seldom balanced, and they morph according to
each party’s influencing ability. For a CSO experiencing negative power imbal-
ances, major responses to stabilize resources are shown in Table 2.
As can be seen in Table 2, each technique to stabilize resources also bears a
danger or raises issues for the CSO. Further, these tactics can be inter-depen-
dent. For example, Froelich (1999) explains that the search for multiple revenue
sources (Response B.) has encouraged CSOs in the United States to pursue
commercial activities in addition to government funding, private philanthropy
(individual and corporate), and service-fees. While such tactics may increase
resources availability, it increases the risk of organizational goal displacement
(“mission drift” – Response D). Accordingly, resource dependence constrains
CSOs’ operating environments (Froelich 1999).
Although Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) called for more empirical research
assessing resource dependency theory, yet predominantly research has consid-
ered how CSOs can address funding issues (Froelich 1999). Toepler (2010) called
for more attention to remedies for non-financial resource dependence and CSOs’
achievements of social objectives especially in changing contexts. Due to the
danger of mission drift as a response to environmental change (Toepler 2010)
and the need for balancing operations (Eerson 1962), we specifically analyze the
impact of the Sarkozy reforms on the CSO-government interrelationships and
dependencies to generate new understandings of possible responses to resource
dependencies in the public sphere.
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To survive, it is hypothesized that CSOs like COPR attempt to restore the
power and resource balance. The responses shown in Table 2 are analyzed in turn.
5.1 Motivational withdrawal
Local public institutions’ fiscal autonomy is dramatically decreasing, margin-
alizing them within public sphere relationships. Although the majority of future
costs will be borne by the local public sphere (when residents who are ill-
socialized become social problems), the State caps current spending. Further,
public funders’ unilateral introduction of for-profit managerial evaluation prac-
tices such as KPIs, centralized training and instructions, introduce tensions in
public sphere interrelationships. The funders’ high staff turnover and ambigu-
ous funder-CSO communication has generated confrontational relationships.
Compliance/administration costs have soared without increased effectiveness
in the allocation of public funds. Tardiness in professionalizing the funders’
“unique portal” has increased CSOs’ and governments’ costs.
Table 2: Responses to resource dependency imbalances
Resource stabilization technique
(Emerson 1962)
Danger or issues arising from using this
resource stabilization technique
A. Motivational withdrawal Lose funds and need to seek alternative
sources (see B.) in order not to fail (e.g.
Froelich 1999).
B. Cultivation of alternative social relations
(including coalition and group forming;
revenue diversification, Froelich 1999)
1. Fear of losing autonomy (e.g. Cumming
2009) or face heightened competition
(Froelich 1999).
2. Reluctance to diversify revenue further (e.g.
Cumming 2008); also costs of accountability
processes rise with increased revenue
diversity (Froelich 1999).
C. “Giving status” (assume greater power
in the relationship)
May lack energy to do so or fear alienation (as
found in Cumming 2009 where Development
NGOs were slow to advocate for more resources)
D. Change values to align with greater
power
Mission drift (e.g. Dacombe’s 2011 UK study
found a dependence on government money
meant CSOs met government priorities rather
than beneficiaries’ needs; Froelich 1999 found
that corporate funders were more likely to
impose mission drift on CSOs).
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COPR could embrace professionalization and entrepreneurship, and with-
draw from its pillar of a public funding. Not all members agree, but the President
of COPR is a significant promoter of this solution stating “I must make clear to
the board members, the director and the employees that we have to develop
some commercial activities.”
5.2 Cultivation of alternative social relations
COPR is strongly inter-related within its local public sphere, including with other
CSOs. Its Board members argue COPR should strengthen its ties with local CSOs,
improving the whole network’s capacity to resist local authorities’ changes. Yet,
the funders’ calls for competitive tenders spawn tensions among local CSOs. For
example, a COPR executive confesses having blown the whistle on another CSO
to local public funders to gain advantage. The COPR chairman says: “Imagine I
was working at the General Council and do decide to sign a multi-year agree-
ment with COPR … other associations will tell me … you signed with COPR and
you do not want to sign with us. What is that thing? And suddenly, it is the
opening of Pandora’s box. Do you understand? It’s unmanageable.”
Further, while COPR previously depended on cultivating multiple social
relations within the public sphere, the single-desk approach for granting sub-
sidies and public funds has rendered this ineffective. The new imperative is for
COPR to promote new relationships with alternative partners (including founda-
tions and for-profit sponsors) – not only to gain funding from these partners but
also to improve its chances of receiving public funding. Alternatively, COPR
could develop new hybrid activities to gain access to new resources, but this
effort to reduce resource dependence could erode its legitimacy when the dis-
tinctions between CSOs and other sectors are blurred (Froelich 1999). In addi-
tion, while COPR could mobilize its volunteers as “reciprocity resources,” the
COPR manager describes such a mobilization as time consuming, without a
guarantee of results, and very difficult to achieve. Therefore, although improv-
ing volunteer management could create more resources, it requires greater
investment.
5.3 Giving status
Local actors agree that COPR is “too big to fail” because of its size, its legiti-
macy, and its history. Reminding resource providers of its legitimacy is another
tactic for COPR. Potentially local public funders could be persuaded by COPR’s
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Chairman and Executive Director to offer multiple-year contracts to COPR, as
they are actors with high levels of social capital. But local public funders’
reduced autonomy makes this increasingly difficult. A board member says:
“Funders do not have the time, they do not. Now, it may be necessary for us
to put more pressure on them. We should be a little more stubborn in the
funding request.” Consequently, some COPR board members warn that this
response is already too late and that COPR must advance with new forms of
resistance.
5.4 Change values to align with greater power
It can be seen from the defense of the three pillars of COPR that a definitive
change of mission (or even a mission drift) is vehemently argued against by
COPR members. Nevertheless, they have been tempted by funding for literacy
and potential commercial activities and it may be only a matter of time before
one or other of the three pillars described above will morph to respond to
funding opportunities.
Emerson’s typology has been explored by COPR to resolve its power-depen-
dence issues, yet no one option is unproblematic. Motivational withdrawal and
cultivation of alternative social relations recognizes an emergent paradigm and
COPR’s need to admit defeat or innovate to secure its future. Giving status to
their work, and coalition and group formation are defensive methods to main-
tain operations. While forming networks should increase the power of COPR and
other public sphere participants, competition makes this an uneasy proposition.
COPR members cannot agree on how best to address the issue, but its best
option is to mobilize its volunteer resources, influential actors, and innovative
spirit to fight for survival and autonomy.
Eventually, it seems that the turn toward professionalization leads to an
aporia and is still to be taken as both COPR and its public funders lack the
necessary skills and resources to sustain it. Prior to the policy changes, the
relationship between COPR and local authorities (shown in Figure 1) was based
on trust and legitimacy with the local territory and COPR agreeing activity
funding in line with COPR’s mission, as well as evaluation of the quality of its
action on social bonds. Now COPR is viewed through a one-sided control lens as
a collection of different projects considered in isolation from one another. As the
global contribution of it and other CSOs at the level of a territory cannot be
quantitatively measured and apprehended at the level of a single project or set
of activities, there is likely to be a deleterious effect on the social bonds in the
community. This is shown in Figure 2 as a “discontinuity.” It is suggested that
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the local territory needs to be reintroduced into the government framework, in
order to enlarge the State’s vision and to reintroduce trust, rather than control
and competition.
Such discontinuity is blamed on deficiencies in financial resources, a com-
mon discussion in terms of resource dependency. Nevertheless Toepler (2010)
called for research into resource dependency that focuses not on funding alone,
accordingly this research has also highlighted the interrelationships and inter-
actions that impact legitimacy and support for CSOs participating in the public
sphere.
6 Conclusion
This article fills a lacuna in the English literature on recent political and cultural
changes in CSO-government relationships in France – relationships that
Archambault (2001) describes as relatively new due to France’s etatist past. It
considers a specific case study in migrant services, analyzing the effects of
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Figure 2: Since 2010: projects based funding
190 D. Mourey et al.
Brought to you by | Aston University Library & Information
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/20/18 4:28 PM
CSO’s interrelationships and how it can respond to those changes in power and
local interdependencies. As shown in Table 1, the case study organization
experienced a “before” and an “after” in its public sphere inter-relationships
in respect of its three historically informed pillars: a public funding, the mission
and program, and its values. This CSO lost resources because it valued tolerance
and engagement with local migrants, rather than narrowing or changing its
clientele. Funding availability impacted its mission and projects. Although pre-
viously the CSO was perceived as an innovator in the public sphere and enjoyed
high levels of legitimacy, social insertion was no longer valued by public
funders. The new occupational insertion imperative threatens to force the CSO
to transform its focus. An emphasis on project funding has led to unintended
consequences; reduced social integration of migrants and refugees, increased
societal costs and a mission crisis in this CSO.
The CSO must re-focus all of its resources: reputational, legitimacy, social
network, and community of volunteers, to continue. While Emerson (1962) offers
a power-dependence typology, the CSO’s dependence on resources limits its
options. Tactics such as cultivating alternate social relations take time, coali-
tions are dangerous in a competitive environment and motivational withdrawals
risk mission drift. Further, the CSO has limited its options by reminiscing about
its legitimacy and status, which no longer allows it to be sufficiently resourced
to advance in the current environment. In addition, the members long to retain
France’s etatist past, but economic strictures and policy changes have left them
behind.
The preferred approach to reduce this CSO’s resource dependency is to
cultivate alternative social relations, altering the public sphere inter-relation-
ships radically and potentially rupturing the three pillars on which this organi-
zation was built. Thus, it could increase funding diversity (as recommended by
Froelich 1999), yet, although Morange (2008), Warsmann (2009) and Langlais
(2008) argue for better partnering and dialog between government and CSO to
increase effectiveness and efficiency, COPR finds these relationships are ambig-
uous and on the funders’ terms alone. However, by acknowledging the range of
resources at its disposal and its dependence on them (Pfeffer and Salancik
2003), it must also continue to utilize its committed volunteers and powerful
supporters to work with migrants and refugees in the area.
While this research focused on a CSO delivering migrant and refugee ser-
vices, it could be extended longitudinally within this sector or to other CSOs
experiencing political challenges. Further, of the four possible responses to
power dependence, it appears that the most palatable (but resource-consuming)
is to cultivate new relationships. This was supported in Cumming’s (2009) study,
but in collaboration with arguing for greater power. Froelich’s (1999) review also
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supported new (funding) relationships in order to diversify revenue. Therefore, a
comparative analysis with CSOs internationally may confirm or generate new
suitable responses to centralizing power and local interdependencies.
This article has also highlighted the disconnection between central policies
requiring professionalization, and the lack of appropriate skills and resources in
the CSO studied and its public funders. Such centralizing reduced this CSO to a
collection of different projects considered in isolation from one another as single
projects rather than a holistic operation to integrate migrants. As a result, the
benefits of social and occupational insertion are in jeopardy as this and similar
CSOs lose their power to lobby and work for change within the public sphere.
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